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ANTITRUST AS A PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIP:




What one perceives depends on where one stands. From one
perspective, the conduct of the private plaintiffs and the government
in the In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation' reflects re-
spective private or governmental interests. From another perspective,
Nasdaq represents a clash between the old Chicago school thinking,
that "it couldn't have happened in theory and therefore it didn't hap-
pen in fact," and post-Chicago school empirical thinking, that "it evi-
dently happened in fact, so let's see whether the theory needs adjust-
ment." Last, but not least, from the perspective of public policy, the
Nasdaq litigation epitomizes the complementary roles, and synergy,
of private and public enforcement as envisioned by the Clayton Act.
Ultimately, public and private enforcement dramatically reduced
the trading costs paid by individual and institutional investors in buy-
ing or selling securities traded on the Nasdaq National Market, revo-
lutionized the rules under which the Nasdaq market operates, and
achieved what apparently was and remains the largest financial re-
covery in the history of the antitrust laws.
The settlements achieved by the private, class action plaintiffs
totaled $1.027 billion. Those settlements apparently are the largest
recovery, by settlement or paid judgment, in the more than one hun-
dred year history of the federal and state antitrust laws.2
t Arthur M. Kaplan was one of plaintiffs' co-lead counsel in the In re Nasdaq Market-
Makers Antitrust Litigation, together with Christopher Lovell, Leonard B. Simon and Robert A.
Skimick. He is a member of the American Antitrust Institute's Advisory Board.
' 184 F.R.D. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
2 The $634,900,000 antitrust settlement in ETSI Pipeline Project v. Burlington North-
em, Inc., No. B-84-979, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18796 (E.D. Tex. 1989) apparently was the
largest antitrust recovery before the Nasdaq recovery. (Larger recoveries had been won else-
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I. NASDAQ 101
There are tales about how this was achieved, but first a brief les-
son in Nasdaq 101. Unlike the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE")
and other markets built on an auction model, where investors trade
against one another (through brokers, with a single "specialist" for
each security maintaining the orderly flow of trading), the counter-
party to a purchase or sale of securities on the Nasdaq National Mar-
ket is a professional market-maker trading for its own account. The
Nasdaq model fundamentally relies on competition between market-
makers to offer the best buy-side quotation and the best sell-side quo-
tation, thereby minimizing the so-called bid/ask spread between those
prices. The spread is the difference between the best buy-side quota-
tion and the best sell-side quotation, and represents the cost (along
with brokerage commissions) of a complete buy and sell turnaround.
The spread is a trading cost borne by individual and institutional in-
vestors. It also is the source of market-makers' income.
A. Brief Overview of the Nasdaq Proceedings
Nasdaq is not an example of private plaintiffs passively follow-
ing in the footsteps of the government. As put by the federal district
court in approving the $1.027 billion settlements: "Notably, this is not
a case where 'plaintiffs' counsel can be cast as jackals to the govern-
ment's lion, arriving on the scene after some enforcement or adminis-
trative agency has made the kill."3
Instead, as put by Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., who served as
a member of the Legal Advisory Board to the National Association
of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), not only did private plaintiffs
"awake the federal government to ... price collusion that the gov-
ernment had previously ignored," but also pulled "the principal
laboring oar in advancing this case."
4
Private plaintiffs filed their cases more than two years before the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice ("DOJ") or the Secu-
where by judgment at trial, but lost on appeal.) After Nasdaq, a class action settlement in the In
re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation was announced with a maximum value of $1.05 billion, briefly
making it antitrust's Empire State to Nasdaq's Chrysler Building. However, because of a
claims reduction clause in the Vitamins settlement (not present in Nasdaq) and unusually large
opt-outs, by "companies representing 75 percent of the vitamins purchased" (to pursue individ-
ual cases), the actual amount paid under the Vitamins class action is approximately $242 mil-
lion. See Settlement in Vitamin Case is Approved, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 31, 2000, at C5. See also
In re Vitamins Antitrust litigation, No. 99-197 (TFH), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8931, at *35
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000) (approving settlement agreement).
3 In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, 187 F.R.D. 465, 488 n.23 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (citation omitted).
4 Affidavit of John C. Coffee, Jr. 24, In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation,
M.D.L. No. 1023, No. 94 Civ. 3996 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. 1998) [hereinafter Coffee Affidavit].
Professor Coffee is the Adolph A. Berle Professor of Law at Columbia Law School.
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rities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") filed their complaints. As
observed by the then-general counsel of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, private counsel were the catalyst for the government, rather than
vice versa: "NASDAQ did not follow a prior governmental investiga-
tion. Indeed, the private action appears to have triggered the govern-
mental activity."
5
Private plaintiffs filed their initial lawsuits in May 1994, and
immediately obtained orders (before and after multidistrict transfer)
suspending the periodic destruction of crucial audiotapes, long before
any government subpoenas. Private counsel and private economists
also provided the DOJ with direct and economic evidence that helped
keep the government investigation alive through periods of skepti-
cism.
On the other hand, the private cases eventually benefited from
the fruits of government discovery. Likewise, the filing of the DOJ
and SEC complaints and consent decrees in 1996 helped private
counsel achieve a difficult, and arguably unprecedented, class certifi-
cation. As stated by Professor Arthur R. Miller in his affidavit sub-
mitted in support of settlement approval, the class action plaintiffs
overcame "enormous litigation risks" and achieved an "extraordinary
result." 6 However, those results weren't achieved in a vacuum.
Instead, private counsel and private economists danced a dance
with their counterparts at the SEC and perhaps more so, with their
counterparts at the Antitrust Division of the DOJ. As shown below
chronologically, the music sometimes quickened or slowed, and
sometimes private plaintiffs or the government took the lead. In the
end, the music achieved a crescendo that no one, least of all defen-
dants, predicted at the start.
Clearly, a billion dollar recovery was beyond initial expectations.
Likewise, no one initially expected the spreads on most Nasdaq secu-
rities to narrow dramatically. These results were achieved through
several years of cooperative piivate and government enforcement ef-
forts. Of course, there were disagreements and disputes along the
way, when governmental and private interests legitimately diverged.
In general, however, there was a deeply held commitment to
public/private cooperation on the part of private counsel and the then-
current leadership of the Antitrust Division.7 This should serve as a
5 Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement Official's Reflections On Antitrust Class Actions, 39
ARIz. L. REV. 413, 422 (1997). See id. at 443 ("NASDAQ's genesis was entirely private.").6 Affidavit of Arthur R. Miller in Support of Final Settlement Approval and Petition for
Counsel Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses 19, Nasdaq, M.D.L. No. 1023, No. 94 Civ.
3996 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. 1998) [hereinafter Miller Affidavit]. Professor Miller is the Bruce
Brorrley Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. He also is the co-author of CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (5th ed. 1999).
7 Among others in the Antitrust Division leadership, who particularly deserve credit, are:
Anne K. Bingaman, who was the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division
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model for the future, and has not always been so in other cases and
administrations. From a birds-eye view, this coordination of efforts
represented public and private enforcement at its best. But let's now
descend from this overview to see the "patient etherized upon the ta-
ble. "
8
B. How The Nasdaq Recovery Was Won-Relevant History
1. Investigation and Early Complaints
Private plaintiffs began their investigation of possible collusion
on Nasdaq following publication of a 1993 Forbes article.9 However,
the direct impetus for these cases was the announcement in 1994 of a
then-forthcoming publication entitled Why Do NASDAQ Market
Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes?, written by two young finance
professors, William G. Christie and Paul H. Schultz.' ° That study
discovered an absence of odd-eighth quotations on many high-profile
Nasdaq securities within a sample of 100 securities, and inferred
"tacit" collusion from the absence of plausible legitimate explana-
tions. In effect, spreads on the affected Nasdaq securities were
rounded-up to the nearest even-eighth, and were therefore substan-
tially larger than spreads on comparable securities traded on the
NYSE.11
Initially in 1994, Wall Street "insiders" said "there's not much"
to the case, while "street lawyers said they were not overly impressed
by the original pleadings. 'It struck me that ther have remarkably
little in the way of evidence,' [stated] one lawyer." 2
throughout the Nasdaq investigation; K. Craig Wildfang, who as special deputy assistant super-
vised much of the investigation; Hays Gorey, the senior staff attorney who directly supervised
the later phases of the investigation; and Jack Worland, who was the senior staff attorney most
directly charged with that investigation.
8 T.S. ELIOT, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, in T.S. ELIOT: THE COMPLETE POEMS
AND PLAYS, 1909-1950 3 (1962).
9 Gretchen Morgenson, Fun and Games on Nasdaq, FORBES, Aug. 16, 1993, at 74 (criti-
cizing clout of large market-makers trading on Nasdaq at the expense of individual investors).
10 William Christie & Paul Schultz, Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth
Quotes?, 49 J. FIN. 1813, 1840 (1994) (inferring that Nasdaq dealers may have "tacitly" col-
luded to maintain wide spreads).
11 One-eighth (ofa dollar) was the most common spread on actively traded NYSE securi-
ties. By contrast, the minimum spread on Nasdaq securities on which odd-eighth quotations
were avoided, by definition, was one-quarter. Ironically, in the glare of publicity about the
initial study and private lawsuits, Nasdaq market-makers soon began using a normal comple-
ment of odd-eighth quotations (after avoidance for years) on certain high-profile Nasdaq securi-
ties. This had the effect of dramatically narrowing the spreads on those securities. Professors
Christie and Schultz followed up with a second study, concluding that in the absence of any
apparent structural or economic explanation for this startling change, the switch to a normal
complement of odd and even quotations, with resulting narrower spreads, itself tended to con-
firm their earlier hypothesis of collusion. See id. at 1859.
12 Hal Lux, Wall Street on Trial, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Aug. 1, 1994, at 16, 18.
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The securities industry subsequently attempted to silence Profes-
sors Christie and Schultz by threatening a libel action, and for a while
even stopped Professor Christie from using the word "collusion." 13
The industry sought to refute these young turks (who were honored in
retrospect by their peers) by hiring their mentor, Nobel laureate Prof.
Merton Miller, and other prominent economists to roundly criticize
their work at a highly publicized conference.
With economic criticism of this kind, widespread skepticism was
not easily or quickly put to rest. Nearly a year after the private cases
were fied, an in-depth analysis in the April 6, 1995 New York Times
commented favorably on several industry-sponsored studies:
'There is much less here than meets the eye,' said Merton
Miller, the Nobel Prize-winning economist from the Univer-
sity of Chicago .... He said a study by him and four col-
leagues found similar clustering [at round numbers] in sev-
eral foreign markets .... Dean Furbush of Economics Inc...
• argued that "the market structure makes any collusion in-
conceivable." He pointed to the large number of market-
makers and the ease of entry into the business, as proof ....
Allan Kleidon of the Stanford Law School and Robert D.
Willig, a Princeton economist.., concluded that competitive
economic factors accounted for the evident discrepancies
found by Mr. Christie and Mr. Schultz. 14
The Times commentary concluded that "when all is said and done"
the absence of explicit collusion "might be the conclusion reached by
all."15
Industry-retained experts even convinced a group of prominent
financial economists (the "Shadow SEC") to publicly dishavow a cen-
tral finding of the Christie and Schultz paper-rejecting the proposi-
13 See William Power, Academics Fan Flames of Nasdaq Fairness Debate, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 7, 1995, at Cl ("Prof. Christie stood by the findings of the paper .... But pro-Nasdaq
observers noted that he didn't use the word collusion .... Paul Godek, an economist who sides
with Nasdaq, said in his presentation that, 'I'm gratified to hear that Mr. Christie has managed
to deliver that entire presentation--check me on this-without using the word collusion.' That
shows 'some progress has been made."').
14 Floyd Norris, Market Place: The Battle of the Studies: Is there competition at Nasdaq?,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1995, at D10.
15 Id. The principal exception to widespread skepticism in the press was a series of inves-
tigative articles by Scott Paltrow in the Los Angeles Times. See, e.g., Scott Paltrow, Study Sug-
gests Collusion Among Brokerage Firms, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 1994, at D3 (supporting investi-
gation).
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tion that Nasdaq spreads are greater than spreads for comparable se-
curities on the NYSE.
16
If private plaintiffs had not filed and tenaciously pursued the
Nasdaq litigation, the Christie and Schultz study might have become
a mere footnote to history. In fact, Professor Schultz later reviewed
these events and concluded that: "I have no doubt that neither the
settlement, nor the lasting improvement in Nasdaq spreads, would
have occurred in the absence of the vigorous and creative prosecution
of the class action .... I believe, from my conversations with him,
that Professor Christie is of the same opinion."'
17
The private complaints were filed beginning in May 1994. In
developing these cases, private counsel conferred with economists
and witnesses. Private counsel also arranged for maverick market-
makers to break even-eighth spreads, and monitored the resulting
conversations, which reflected the enforcement of market-maker col-
lusion.
Neither the SEC nor the DOJ opened formal investigations until
the fall of 1994, after the class actions were filed. In fact, the pre-
liminary investigation at the Department initially was assigned to a
junior level attorney, who accepted the industry argument that collu-
sion could not have occurred among so many market-makers, and
who, therefore, intended to terminate the investigation without taking
discovery.
Without resuscitation, through early and successive presentations
of direct and economic evidence by private counsel and private
economists (including Prof. Schultz), the Department investigation
would have died a premature death.
2. Preservation of Important Audiotapes
As noted above, private counsel immediately obtained a docu-
ment preservation order, even before multidistrict transfer, that inter
alia prevented the ordinary periodic erasure and recycling of audio-
tapes. That preservation order was incorporated by Judge Sweet into
Pretrial Order No. 1, following multidistrict transfer.
Defendants soon moved the court to permit the resumption of
erasure and reuse of audiotapes, arguing that continued preservation
was too costly, and that the audiotapes themselves were irrelevant.
Private plaintiffs' counsel knew from their own monitoring of conver-
sations that these tapes might contain important evidence.
16 See Power, supra note 13, at C13 (noting that the Shadow SEC was unable to conclude
if any difference in spreads existed).
17 Affidavit of Professor Paul H. Schultz 6, Nasdaq, M.D.L. No. 1023, No. 94 Civ. 3996
(RWS) (S.D.N.Y. 1998) [hereinafter Schultz Affidavit].
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Private plaintiffs, therefore, countered by offering to take the
tapes off defendants' hands, at plaintiffs' expense, in discovery. De-
.fendants thereupon summarily withdrew their motion, tacitly confirm-
ing plaintiffs' belief in the potential importance of the audiotapes.
Without the early preservation orders, and private counsel's
thwarting the resumed recycling of audiotapes, crucial evidence
would have been lost to private plaintiffs and the government, thereby
radically changing the course of events. The thousands of hours of
preserved audiotape eventually provided important, direct evidence of
collusion.
3. Private Plaintiffs' Early Contacts with the SEC and the DOJ
Regarding Preemption and the Merits
As noted above, the private cases initially met with skepticism in
the business and financial community. Prominent economists (often
sponsored by the industry) argued that there was no conspiracy, and
that a conspiracy could not possibly succeed given the structure of the
Nasdaq National Market, which included hundreds of market-makers
in the aggregate, and often thirty or more registered market-makers
for a particular security. They argued, moreover, that the absence of
odd-eighth quotations reflected an ordinary, entirely innocent phe-
nomenon: namely, the convenience of using round numbers.
This litigation was widely portrayed as lacking in factual or eco-
nomic foundation (other than anecdotal conversations and the specu-
lations of two young economists). Defense counsel privately men-
tioned to plaintiffs' counsel the possibility of a Rule 11 motion. They
publicly forecast a motion to dismiss that would terminate the litiga-
tion once and for all.
Defendants, including several dozen of the nation's largest bro-
kerage firms, planned to file a motion arguing antitrust preemption,
based on comprehensive regulation by the NASD, which owns and
regulates Nasdaq, and by the SEC, which regulates the NASD.18
However, private plaintiffs successfully blocked such a motion.
Private plaintiffs drafted a Consolidated Complaint expressly averring
that defendants' spread-fixing was unauthorized by the NASD and
SEC. Private plaintiffs then spoke with the SEC, which already had
been contacted by defendants. Defendants had requested an amicus
brief from the SEC supporting preemption. The SEC gave plaintiffs
an opportunity to respond.
Plaintiffs' counsel met with the SEC's senior staff, and thor-
oughly explored the law as applied to plaintiffs' draft Consolidated
IS See Lux, supra note 12, at 16-19 ("'A government agency's blessing can have an im-
munizing effect,' says one lawyer .... Defendants are also expected to argue that the SEC
should have primary jurisdiction in the case.").
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Complaint, as well as the facts currently known to plaintiffs. By the
conclusion of the meeting, the SEC senior staff decided, on the basis
of the facts alleged, that the draft complaint would not be preempted,
and that the SEC, therefore, would not support defendants' antici-
pated motion.
Private plaintiffs also met with senior officials at the Antitrust
Division of the DOJ. As noted above, plaintiffs found that an infor-
mal, preliminary investigation had been assigned to a junior staff at-
torney, who had already concluded in his own mind that there was
nothing worth investigating.19
Private plaintiffs lit a fire under the Department's investigation
by repeatedly furnishing direct and economic evidence. In late Octo-
ber 1994, the DOJ announced the opening of a formal investigation.
Plaintiffs also alerted the Department to the perils of an antitrust pre-
emption motion that could foreclose the Department's own antitrust
investigation.
As a result of plaintiffs' efforts, defendants were faced with a
strong Consolidated Complaint, and an SEC and DOJ unsupportive of
preemption.
4. Overcoming Defendants' Efforts at Dismissal on Alternative
Grounds
The motion to dismiss thereafter filed by defendants backed
away from the announced preemption argument. Instead, it alterna-
tively argued: (1) that plaintiffs had only alleged "conscious parallel-
ism," not actionable under the antitrust laws; (2) that plaintiffs had
not alleged enough about the individual role of each defendant; and
(3) that plaintiffs must include in their complaint a list of the affected
securities.2 °
The first and second defenses went to the adequacy of the
pleaded facts, as well as to issues of law. If defendants had prevailed
on either or both of these defenses, the case would effectively have
been over, except for appeals, because plaintiffs had pled essentially
all of the then-available evidence, before discovery. With regard to
the third defense, plaintiffs and their economists already had begun a
massive study, utilizing immense computerized databases. As a result
of this in-depth study, and the accompanying analysis, plaintiffs'
economists were able to prepare a list identifying the 1,659 Class Se-
curities targeted by the conspiracy, before argument on defendants'
motion.
19 That staff attorney not long thereafter joined a law firm representing one of the defen-
dants, and the Department required that a "Chinese wall" be erected around him.
2o See In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, 894 F. Supp. 703, 710
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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After extensive briefing of the law, facts, and economic argu-
ments, plaintiffs prevailed against defendants on their first and second
defenses, each of which was potentially dispositive.21 If private plain-
tiffs had not prevailed on fundamental adequacy of the pleadings,
there would have been no private cases, and likely no continuing gov-
ernment investigation.
5. Continuing Assistance and Cooperation in the Government
Investigation
Throughout late 1994, 1995, and into 1996, private plaintiffs and
economists retained by private plaintiffs, continued to encourage and22
assist the government investigation. Plaintiffs and their economists,
principally Professors Paul Schultz and Michael Barclay, repeatedly
met with the DOJ. Plaintiffs' counsel continued to provide the De-
partment with direct evidence developed through plaintiffs' own in-
vestigation, including witness interviews. Plaintiffs' economists de-
veloped extensive additional economic evidence, which they shared
with the Department's economists.
Although the DOJ and the SEC scrupulously maintained confi-
dentiality, questions and comments by staff reflected a gradual shift
as the governmental investigations and private plaintiffs amassed im-
pressive evidence. However, the government's thinking had its ap-
parent twists and turns.
At times, defendants and their economists nearly convinced the
DOJ that no conspiracy existed, or that no conspiracy could have suc-
ceeded among several hundred Nasdaq market-making firms. One
senior Department official remained openly skeptical until the elev-
enth hour, when audiotapes and other evidence left little to the imagi-
nation. Each rebuttal by plaintiffs effectively answered a new series
of arguments advanced by defendants and their economists.
6. The DOJ and the SEC File Their Complaints and Consent Decrees
Eventually, both the DOJ and the SEC filed their own com-
plaints and concurrent consent decrees, in July 1996, and September
1996, respectively, more than two years into the private litigation.
The Antitrust Division's July 17, 1996 consent decree, involving two
dozen of the nation's largest market-makers, not only forbade all
21 See id. at 711-13. The district court held that since plaintiffs could prepare such a list
(and, indeed, had already done so), the list of Class Securities should be included in the com-
plaint. See id. at 711. Accordingly, the list was made part of an Amended Consolidated Com-
plaint. It subsequently withstood enormous economic scrutiny.
22 After the announcement of the Christie and Schultz study, Professor Schultz was re-
tained by plaintiffs together with other economists, including Professor Michael Barclay. Pro-
fessor Christie declined retention by plaintiffs, as well as by defendants, in order to preserve his
professional neutrality.
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forms of price-fixing (including, but not limited to, odd-eighth avoid-
ance), but also required antitrust compliance programs, appointment
of antitrust compliance officers, annual compliance certifications, and
the taping and monitoring of a specified sample of market-maker
telephone conversations.23
The SEC's August 8, 1996 consent agreement with the NASD,
which owns and operates Nasdaq, fundamentally reorganized the
NASD and Nasdaq in order to include a non-industry majority in the
governance of the NASD, and to provide enhanced and independent
regulation and monitoring of Nasdaq.
The SEC, beginning in January 1997, also began implementing
new trading rules for Nasdaq. The new rules in effect made limit or-
ders and proprietary trading system (e.g., Instinet) quotations gener-
ally available to investors, as additional sources of competition to the
market-makers' own Nasdaq quotations. The new rules (expressly
formulated in response to imperfect competition on Nasdaq) furthered
and systematized the narrowing of spreads that already had occurred
on many high profile Nasdaq securities, under the glare of publicity
and private litigation. 24
7. Achieving a Difficult, and Arguably Unprecedented, Class
Certification
The record-breaking $1.027 billion private recovery would not
have been achieved without substantial direct evidence of collusion
(including evidence of how and why the particular 1,659 Class Secu-
rities were targeted for collusion) and persuasive economic evidence
of damages. Nor would it have been achieved without an extremely
difficult (and defendants would say unprecedented) class certification.
Even the discovery leading to class certification became a major
battlefield72 The first step in achieving class certification was devel-
oping a class definition that would reflect the considerable intricacies
of the case, without seeming unduly complex or being underinclusive
or overinclusive. Plaintiffs created a novel definition that, through a
facially simple and straightforward phrase ("Class Securities"), fused
the class definition with sophisticated economic studies. This mar-
riage of law and economics enabled plaintiffs to target only the af-
fected 1,659 securities, and the appropriate months for each, thereby
2 Thirteen of the defendants in the litigation were not sued by the Department of Justice
in its complaint. Generally, the Department sued only the largest market-makers.
24 After the private cases were settled for $1.027 billion, the SEC imposed monetary and
disciplinary sanctions against certain market-makers and some of their employees for related
conduct. These monetary sanctions totaled approximately $26,200,000.
25 See, e.g., Pretrial Order No. 3, In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, 1996-
1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,407 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (seeking order to allow depositions of certain
class representatives prior to certification).
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enabling plaintiffs to overcome potentially fatal arguments that the
class definition was indefinite or overinclusive.26
Defendants raised innumerable defenses to class certification,
and represented to the court that under Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
27
and its progeny, no broad class action had ever been certified, or
could be certified, in the securities industry.
After exhaustive discovery, including thrity-seven depositions
regarding defendants' financial records, the exchange of many ex-
perts' reports and depositions, voluminous briefing, and extensive
oral argument, the court certified the class.28 The court's opinion
suggests the extraordinary number and breadth of issues raised by
defendants in opposition to class certification.29
For example, plaintiffs overcame defendants' argument that buy-
ers and sellers were in conflict with one another, and could not be
included in the same class. According to defendants, even if damages
were assumed to exist, whether the damages on any particular trade
were sustained on the buyer side versus the seller side would be an
issue of fact that necessarily would have to be evaluated separately in
millions of transactions.30
Many potential experts and consultants frankly told plaintiffs
that this and other certification problems might be insuperable. If
plaintiffs' counsel and plaintiffs' economists had accepted that advice
there would have been no class, and no recovery.
After many meetings and discussions, plaintiffs' counsel and
plaintiffs' economists developed a solution to the buyer/seller conun-
drum, utilizing an arcane economic measurement known as the "ef-
fective half-spread.",31 This measurement had been used by financial
2 Significantly, despite extensive depositions of Professors Barclay and Schultz, defen-
dants were unable to establish any substantial inaccuracy or overinclusion in the identity of
Class Securities.
27 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
28 See In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust litigation, 169 F.R.D. 493, 532 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) ("Plaintiffs' motion for class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is hereby granted in part, as set forth above.").
29 In addition to working closely with their own experts in developing studies and argu-
ments, plaintiffs took highly effective depositions of several of the defendants' experts. These
depositions, principally taken by Joseph Goldberg, severely undermined the defense experts'
previously submitted opinions.
30 According to defendants, since the mechanism of the conspiracy was to enlarge quota-
tions by 1/8 (from an odd-eighth to an even-eighth), damages necessarily involved changing
either the bid or the ask by 1/8, but not both. According to this argument, since the minimum
"tick" size for quotations generally was 1/8 (rather than 1/16th), a separate transaction-by-
transaction analysis would be required to determine whether at any given moment it was the
buyer side, or the seller side, that was injured. If so, this case would be unmanageable as a class
action, according to defendants, because of the millions of transactions that would have to be
separately analyzed.
31 The "effective half-spread" is the difference between the actual price and the mid-point
of the bid and ask quotations.
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economists in academic studies of this particular micromarket. Pri-
vate plaintiffs and their economists successfully argued that it also
reflected market realities.32 The measurement effectively assigned
one-half of the damages to the buyer side and one-half to the seller
side, thereby resolving the alleged conflict and management difficul-
ties.
Likewise, plaintiffs overcame a plethora of arguments concern-
ing brokers and investment advisers as intermediaries under Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois;33 diversity of market-makers, proposed Class
Securities, and class members; other potential conflicts within the
class; predominance of common questions; typicality of claim; and
adequacy of representation. Ultimately, the class was certified as to
all 1,659 Class Securities. 34 The certified class included more than
one million individual investors.35
Plaintiffs then overcame defendants' full-court press to ex-
clude institutional investors who, according to defendants, ac-
counted for most of the trading. Following extensive additional
proceedings, including the filing of further expert reports and
briefs, the court certified the class in its entirety, including tens of
thousands of institutional investors.
36
8. Extensive Discovery Including over 3,000,000 Documents and
over 10,000 Hours of Audiotape
One advantage, among many, of having helped keep the gov-
ernment investigation alive was that plaintiffs eventually were able to
overcome defendants' objections and, step-by-step, obtain access to
the government's evidence. Defendants initially opposed all such
access. After the court indicated that this discovery would be granted,
however, the private parties were able to negotiate the many details in
the September 18, 1995 Stipulated Order Regarding Initial Discovery
and Stipulated Order Regarding Confidential Documents.37
32 Plaintiffs showed through testimony that the effective half-spread reflects the way
investment advisors, and other sophisticated traders, actually determine the size of a negotiated
spread.
33 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) (precluding recoveries by antitrust plaintiffs under a pass-on
theory).
34 See In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, 169 F.R.D. 493, 509 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
35 See id. ("Here, the class numbers at least a million members.. .
36 See In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, 172 F.R.D. 119, 130 (S.D.N.Y
1997). In December 1997, the Court granted plaintiffs' motion to broaden the class period to
include the interim between filing of the private complaints in May 1994 and filing of the De-
partment of Justice complaint on July 17, 1996. See In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust
Litigation, 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,028 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). That certification likewise
assisted in achieving the record-breaking antitrust settlement.
37 See Nasdaq, M.D.L. No. 1023, No. 94 Civ. 3996 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. 1995). These stipu-
lated orders, negotiated at about the same time, represented the first two of many instances
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Plaintiffs reviewed over 2,000,000 pages of document discovery
by October 1996, long before the first settlement was negotiated."
Furthermore, plaintiffs reviewed approximately 4,000 hours of audio-
tape by this time, after overcoming defendants' strenuous resistance
to such discovery.39 This massive review of audiotapes and docu-
ments that already had been produced to the government, of course,
was just one aspect of the private plaintiffs' exhaustive investigation,
which also included many witness interviews and formal discovery
independent of the government investigations.
Discovery by the private plaintiffs was conducted by a discovery
team of eighty-one well-trained, associate level attorneys (assisted by
paralegals), handpicked from the plaintiffs' law firms, and was care-
fully supervised by eleven senior attorneys. The team included a spe-
cialized sub-team of sixty-nine audiotape reviewers. Discovery team
members and supervisors shared evidence through a state-of-the-art
data entry system, with unique retrieval capabilities, and periodic con-
ference calls to keep audiotape reviewers ug-to-speed on insights and
leads in deciphering the complex evidence.
As noted above, defendants strenuously resisted private plain-
tiffs' access to the audiotapes already produced to the government,
and the court initially granted access only to those portions of the au-
diotapes that defendants deemed relevant to the private plaintiffs' al-
legations. Later, over defendants' further objections, the court
granted plaintiffs' motion for access to all of the audiotapes produced
where all parties, after substantial negotiations, were able to voluntarily resolve the myriad
details of massive discovery without unnecessarily burdening the court. Even in circumstances
where resolving or minimizing discovery disputes required a dozen or more meetings (such as a
later June 13, 1997 Stipulation and Order), all parties negotiated the issues.
38 See Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Lift the Stay of
Discovery, at 4, Nasdaq M.D.L. No. 1023, No. 94 Civ. 3996 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (emphasis
added). To date, defendants have provided plaintiffs with access to roughly two million pages
of documents and 4,000 hours of audiotaped conversations. Plaintiffs also have taken signifi-
cant discovery from various third parties, such as the NASD, culminating in the production of
an even greater volume of documents and other materials for plaintiffs to review in connection
with their claims. The NASD alone has produced over 130,000 pages of documents pursuant to
plaintiffs' subpoena.
39 Of course, the private plaintiffs also produced documents, including their own trading
records and the dozens of economic studies on which plaintiffs relied. See, e.g., In re Nasdaq
Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, 929 F. Supp. 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (compelling plain-
tiffs to produce materials related to civil investigation demands).
40 Plaintiffs' co-lead counsel required that each member of the discovery team have sub-
stantial qualifying prior discovery experience. Plaintiffs' co-lead counsel also organized orien-
tation sessions and extensive orientation materials, including an evidentiary compilation, a
video, and written discovery guidelines specific to the case, so that all of the members of the
discovery team would be fully conversant with the case, and the workings and terminology of
the industry, before reviewing tapes or documents. Partners and senior associates, organized as
discovery captains or discovery co-chairs, coordinated and supervised the work of the discovery
team.
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by defendants to the DOJ, including the portions that defendants
deemed irrelevant.41
Eventually, plaintiffs obtained and reviewed in excess of 10,000
hours of audiotape, including thousands of hours of audiotapes (se-
lected by plaintiffs' counsel) that had never been produced to the
government. The tapes were full of indistinct words and industry jar-
gon. Key passages often had to be listened to several times by
knowledgeable reviewers to be understood, then accurately tran-
scribed, and categorized in plaintiffs' computerized database. Among
mountains of dross, however, the reviewers unearthed many nuggets
of pure evidentiary gold.
Likewise, despite defendants' strenuous resistance, plaintiffs
won access to the transcripts of more than 200 depositions taken by
the government.42 Many of these were also valuable, and all were
carefully analyzed and integrated with the other evidence.
43
The DOJ and private plaintiffs diverged, however, with respect
to private access to a compilation of evidence that the Department
created and shared with the defendants for purposes of negotiating a
consent decree. Private plaintiffs argued that any work product pro-
tections had been waived by sharing the evidentiary compilation with
defendants. The government urged that disclosure to plaintiffs would
discourage settlement negotiations in future cases, and that private
plaintiffs already had won access to the documents, audiotapes, depo-
sition transcripts, and other underlying evidence. The government
prevailed.44 The government also prevailed in limiting access to any
future audiotapes prepared solely pursuant to the consent decree.45
Private plaintiffs retained computer experts and developed a cus-
tomized, state-of-the-art data retrieval system in order to integrate and
analyze all of this government evidence together with all of the evi-
dence independently developed by plaintiffs, including confidential
witness interviews. As all of this formal and informal discovery
snow-balled,46 the end result was a giant database and state-of-the-art
41 See Transcript of February 7, 1996 hearing, at 46, Nasdaq, M.D.L. No. 1023, No. 94
Civ. 3996 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[They get the tapes.").
42 See In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, 169 F.R.D. 493, 530-531
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Those CID deposition transcripts already in Defendants' possession must be
produced.").
43 For example, plaintiffs painstakingly compared the government transcripts to the plain-
tiffs' document database to identify any significant documents not covered by the government
examination.
44 See United States v. Bleznak, 153 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that settlement
memorandum was not a determinative document).
45 See id. at 19 (holding that without the consent decree, there would be no tapes to pro-
duce).
46 See, e.g., Pretrial Order No. 4, Nasdaq, M.D.L. No. 1023, No. 94 Civ. 3996 (RWS)
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Pretrial Order No. 5, Nasdaq, M.D.L. No. 1023, No. 94 Civ. 3996 (RWS)
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) and the Stipulation and Order Governing Defendants' Production of Docu-
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retrieval system that was used to great effect in settlement negotia-
tions, including settlement presentations to the court.
Likewise, by immediate investigation and prompt rebuttal, plain-
tiffs were able to counteract a 1997 report by Dr. Susan E. Woodward
(former chief economist of the SEC), prepared under contract for the
Congressional Budget Office, which purported to show that any and
all allegations of conspiracy or harm were unfounded. Defendants
openly boasted in the Wall Street Journal that this new study would
slow plaintiffs' path towards settlement.47
Private plaintiffs discovered and proved Dr. Woodward's indus-
try connections, including her continuing affiliation with the principal
consulting firm for defendants, and her retention by the Securities
Traders Association. Plaintiffs also were able to show the court that
she reached her highly publicized opinions without reviewing certain
relevant materials.
Plaintiffs' counsel ultimately reviewed and analyzed over
3,000,000 pages of documents, and over 10,000 hours of audiotape, in
addition to the numerous depositions taken by plaintiffs, and more
than 200 government transcripts. All of this private and government
evidence was painstakingly integrated in the state-of-the-art database.
Settlement negotiations drew on this wealth of information.
C. History of the Settlement Negotiations
Bearing in mind the confidentiality of negotiations, I will de-
scribe them only in outline.
1. Early Attempted Negotiations
From the outset of the litigation, private plaintiffs made known
to defendants their willingness to explore settlement, individually or
collectively. Before defendants' motion to dismiss was decided, no
defendant was interested in exploring settlement. Even afterwards,
some defendants continued to argue that their cases should be dis-
missed without payment, and the joint defense as a group argued that
any settlement would have to be primarily or entirely in the form of
coupons, rather than cash.
At the time of the class certification argument in 1996, settle-
ment negotiations with one individual defendant began in earnest.
However, after many discussions, its best offer was still inadequate.
ments in Response to Plaintiffs' First Set of Document Requests to All Defendants and Plain-
tiffs' Revised Second Set of Document Requests to All Defendants, Nasdaq, M.D.L No. 1023,
No. 94 Civ. 3996 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
47 See Deborah Lohse, Research Paper That Concludes Nasdaq Dealers Probably Didn't
Fix Prices May Slow Settlements, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1997, at C7.
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It was rejected because it would have set a low benchmark for the rest
of the case.
Collective negotiations with all defendants began soon after the
class certification argument, but before the court's decision certifying
the class. At this stage, defendants offered only a minuscule fraction
of the amount they ultimately agreed to pay.
2. The First Six Individual Settlements, Laying the Groundwork for
Further Large, All-Cash Settlements
Class certification on November 26, 1996, and the growing ac-
cumulation of evidence, led to scores of further meetings and tele-
phone calls exploring settlement. In order to maximize recovery for
the class, private plaintiffs resisted the urge to settle quickly. Instead,
private plaintiffs played the defendants off against each other, indi-
vidually and collectively, and continued to develop their case.
As a result, the first individual settlement was not achieved until
April 9, 1997. That ice-breaking settlement, however, was all cash
(rather than coupons), and was at a level that put other negotiations on
course for a large recovery.
Plaintiffs from the outset openly followed a strategy of ratchet-
ing each settlement upwards-letting all defendants know that each
successive settlement would be progressively greater, per percentage
point of market share. That strategy created strong incentives for
each defendant to settle, rather than be left behind. It also created
strong incentives for defendants to settle as a group, before additional
defendants jumped ship. The individual all-cash settlements also put
increasing pressure on those defendants who had argued that any set-
tlement must be paid in coupons.48
Following exhaustive negotiations, five additional all-cash, indi-
vidual settlements were reached during the spring and summer of
1997, at progressively higher amounts per percentage point of market
share. The first six settlements were preliminarily approved, despite
objections by the joint defense to certain terms.49
48 Plaintiffs also developed other strategies that encouraged defendants to settle. For
example, during class notice negotiations, certain defendants said that they had few, if any,
computerized records identifying class members. Plaintiffs reminded defendants of the docu-
ment preservation orders that had been entered prior to multidistrict transfer in Pretrial Order
No. 1, which expressly included computerized data.
Plaintiffs then served document destruction discovery, and followed up with extensive
negotiations (on a defendant-by-defendant basis) anticipatory to a motion to compel, or a mo-
tion for sanctions. The prospect of a motion to compel or a motion for sanctions encouraged
many defendants to locate additional computerized records that turned out to be in storage or in
the custody of third-party computer service providers. The prospect of a records destruction
motion may have served as an added incentive for some defendants to settle.
49 See In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, 176 F.R.D. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
The contested terms were contingencies in the event that plaintiffs later settled with other de-
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Each successive settlement was structured to maximize the joint
and several responsibility of the remaining defendants, to the fullest
extent permitted by law, for all of the damages occasioned by the
conspiracy. Each settlement thereby increased the financial exposure
of the remaining defendants. This, too, increased pressure on the re-
maining defendants to settle individually or collectively.
3. Extensive Group Settlement Negotiations and the All-Cash,
Record-Breaking Antitrust Group Settlement
Even after class certification, most of the defendants resolutely
resisted the pressure to settle for cash, and plaintiffs' domino strategy
would not have succeeded, by itself, without the fruits of plaintiffs'
massive investigation, and the creative and extensive work of plain-
tiffs' economists, who continued to refute each successive defense
study. One of plaintiffs' negotiating techniques was to update de-
fense counsel with examples (but examples only) of conversations
from recently transcribed tapes, or to advert to recent deposition tes-
timony, recent studies, or recent witness interviews.
At appropriate junctures, the joint defense also was advised that
several unnamed members were willing to settle individually. Plain-
tiffs particularly targeted the joint defense's leadership for individual
settlements. Thus, plaintiffs' third individual settlement was reached
with defendants' own liaison counsel.
Private plaintiffs by all of these means, step-by-step, induced the
joint defense to substantially increase its collective offers. As more
defendants indicated their willingness to explore settlement at
increasingly higher amounts (per percentage point of market share),
the joint defense likewise by necessity began to explore larger num-
bers.By mid-1997, defendants hinted at an aggregate figure that
would modestly exceed the record for any prior antitrust settlement if,
but only if, plaintiffs were willing to accept most of the payment in
coupons. However, until late 1997, the joint defense persisted in ar-
guing that any group settlement would have to be predominantly cou-
pons (redeemable for discounts against future services), rather than
cash.
Plaintiffs' co-lead counsel remained steadfast and maintained a
united front. Instead of claiming victory based on the face value of
coupons, private plaintiffs presented an all-cash global settlement as
the only alternative to more individual settlements, and continued to
fendants for coupons. These contingency provisions, and the objections by the joint defense,
reflected an erroneous belief by the individually settling defendants and the joint defense that
private plaintiffs eventually would capitulate and settle with the joint defense for coupons. See
id. As time would tell, plaintiffs instead achieved all cash settlements.
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develop their case. Only at the eleventh hour did the joint defense
yield its ground on coupons, and agree to an all cash settlement.
Collective negotiations received invaluable help from the district
judge presiding over this multidistrict litigation, Judge Robert W.
Sweet, who initially was asked to participate by defendants. Through
his settlement conferences, which broke crucial logjams, and after
literally dozens of additional out-of-court meetings (often far into the
night), private plaintiffs were finally able to achieve an all cash, re-
cord breaking antitrust recovery.
4. Settlement with the Final Holdout
The last settlement, with defendant Robertson, Stephens &
Company, was signed on March 23, 1998. The final settling defen-
dant had argued its innocence throughout negotiations in 1996, 1997
and into 1998, observing that it had not been included in the DOJ
complaint, and contending that it should, therefore, be dismissed from
the private cases without payment.50 After further helpful settlement
conferences with the court (including candid discussions of the evi-
dence), and further out-of-court discussions, the holdout settled.
Robertson paid as much as any prior settling defendant, per percent-
age point of market share, plus substantial interest.
5. The All-Cash, Record-Breaking Antitrust Settlements and the
Reduction in Spreads
The settlements in the aggregate totaled approximately $1.027
billion. An affidavit of Professor Michael Barclay showed that this
amount approximated plaintiffs' individual damages. 51 The settle-
ments were enthusiastically approved by the court.
The $1.027 billion dollar value does not take into account, how-
ever, the future savings accomplished directly and indirectly by this
litigation and the government proceedings. The private litigation, and
the new SEC rules spurred in part by this litigation, dramatically re-
duced Nasdaq spreads. According to a recent academic study, there
has been a "large decline" in Nasdaq spreads, reflecting newly "com-
petitive pricing., 5
3
5o Thirteen of the private defendants had not been named in any government complaint.
51 Affidavit of Professor Michael J. Barclay in Support of Final Settlement Approval IN 2,
29, Nasdaq, M.D.L. No. 1023, No. 94 Civ. 3996 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
52 See In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, 187 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
"' James P. Weston, Competition on the Nasdaq and the Impact of Recent Market Re-
forms, 55 J. FIN. 2565, 2566 (2000). See also, Michael Barclay et al., Effects of Market Reform
on the Trading Costs and Depths of Nasdaq Stocks, 55 J. FIN. 1 (2000) (finding that for the first
group of 100 Nasdaq securities phased in under the reformed trading rules, quoted and effective
spreads narrowed by approximately 30 percent from 1994 to 1997, with most of the improve-
ment resulting directly from the investigations, publicity, and litigation prior to 1997). Re-
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6. Settlement Distributions to More Than a Million Class Members
Under a bifurcated procedure contemplated by the settlement
agreements, and approved by the court, questions of allocation and
distribution were deferred until after aggregate settlement approval. 4
After settlement approval, the court approved an innovative plan
of distribution, including claim forms with preprinted transaction in-
formation developed from the computerized records of many defen-
dant and non-defendant brokerage firms.55 The preprinted transaction
information included the vast majority of eligible transactions for
most retail members of the class. That innovative plan, which also
included computerized claim filing in a variety of convenient formats
for institutional members of the class, was developed by plaintiffs'
co-lead counsel jointly with a working group of deputy state attorneys
general.5 6 The information pre-printed for claimants included the vast
majority of eligible transactions for most individual members of the
class.57  Eventually, more than a million class members filed valid
claims, and after deduction of attorneys' fees, litigation expenses,
class notice costs, and settlement administration fees and costs, pay-
ments totaling about $896,233,301 were mailed to class members. 8
CONCLUSION
One can recall the situation in 1994, when the securities indus-
try, most journalists, and world-renowned economists expressed skep-
ticism regarding the success of the Nasdaq litigation. As noted by
Professor Coffee, a billion dollar recovery and a substantial reduction
in spreads hardly seemed conceivable.
59
As noted, defendants initially hoped to terminate the entire case
by a motion on the pleadings. Even in its broadest outline, liability in
cently, spreads narrowed further as a result of an SEC mandated switch from trading in fractions
of a dollar (such as 1/4, 1/8, 1/16) to trading in decimal increments of as little as a penny. See
Kate Kelly, Nasdaq Traders Stumbling Over Decimals, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2001, at Cl.
5 See Nasdaq, 187 F.R.D. at 473.
55 See id. at 492.
56 The working group of deputy state attorneys general was co-chaired by Patricia Con-
ners of the Florida Attorney General's Office and Margaret Spencer of the California Attorney
General's office.
57 See Cassell Bryan-Low, Nasdaq Price-Fixing Settlement to Reach Entitled Investors
Soon, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26,2000, at C16 (noting that claim forms already contained investors'
transactions that were stored on computers). Other innovations in the approved plan of distribu-
tion included "electronic" claims in convenient formats for large claimants with voluminous
transaction data, and "positional" claims reconstructed by computer program from end-of-
quarter or end-of-year holdings for claimants who lacked records of purchases and sales. See In
re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, 2000-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,773, at 86,648
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
58 Approximately 1,249,500 claimants received payment, in addition to certain late claims
that were subsequently allowed. The payments to class members have ranged from a minimum
of $25 to more than $11 million. See Nasdaq, 2000-1 Trade Cas. at 86,648.
59 See Coffee Affidavit, supra note 4, U 25-31.
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this case required proof of an unusually complex conspiracy involv-
ing 37 defendants and a checkerboard of fact situations and disparate
periods for each of 1,659 different securities. Other liability issues
included proof of a "common motive," "actions which were against
[defendants'] own individual business interest," and "evidence of co-
ercion. 6 °
The risks overcome in the area of damages were even more for-
midable. Defendants forcefully argued that plaintiffs would be un-
able to prove any damages whatsoever, particularly in light of alleg-
edly offsetting rebates of commissions on Nasdaq trades. Defendants
were able to convince a panel of prominent economists, the Shadow
SEC, to reject the proposition that Nasdaq spreads were greater than
spreads for comparable securities on the NYSE.61  From the outset,
plaintiffs likewise faced enormous risks that the class would not be
certified. As noted by Professor Miller, private plaintiffs achieved an
extremely difficult class certification against great odds.62 The Sec-
ond Circuit's decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,63 established
these extreme risks. Eisen, like this case, involved a broad multi-
security, antitrust class action. In Eisen, after two trips to the Second
Circuit, and one to the Supreme Court, plaintiffs and the putative
class ultimately recovered nothing.
Here, by contrast, private and government cooperation produced
the largest antitrust recovery in history, and revolutionized the or-
ganization and operation of the NASD and the Nasdaq National Mar-
ket. It directly benefited more than one million investors who filed
claims and shared in the $1.027 billion recovery, and indirectly bene-
fited all investors by permanently reducing trading costs.
As Professor Schultz, now a chaired professor of finance at No-
tre Dame, observed in an unsolicited letter on the occasion of the
settlements: "Just a casual look at Nasdaq quotes shows stocks like
Microsoft and Intel trading with a spread of 1/16 today-less than a
quarter of their average spread in early 1994. I have no doubt that
this would not have happened if the civil suits were not filed."
64
That is the way that complementary private and government en-
forcement is supposed to work. Of course, it is not how the govern-
ment and private bar always conduct themselves. However, it pre-
60 In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, 894 F. Supp. 703, 713-14 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).
61 See Power, supra note 13, at C13 (noting that the Shadow SEC was unable to conclude
that there was any difference in spreads or transaction costs between Nasdaq and NYSE).
62 See Miller Affidavit, supra note 6, T 16 ("The contrast between the outcome of this
case, and the outcome of facially similar class certification issues in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacque-
lin well illustrates the enormous risk that was overcome with regard to class certification.")
(citation omitted).
63 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).64 Schultz Affidavit, supra note 17, 4.
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sents an example of the cooperation and results to which the private
bar and government appropriately aspire.

